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Abstract
Increasing beneﬁciary participation to improve public services has become increasingly pop-
ular during the last twenty years. Results from previous studies on the impact of such programs
is mixed and inconsistent. We propose a simple model which explains some of those mixed
results by predicting that returns to participation will vary by community characteristics. We
use data from a randomized pilot project in Niger to test the model in the context of educa-
tion, and ﬁnd support for some of the predictions. We ﬁnd that parents are generally ready
to participate in ways that support the teachers or help them carry out management tasks.
However, only parents with high authority are able to participate in ways that oppose the
teachers, in particular in monitoring teacher attendance. We also show that demand for ed-
ucation (measured by enrollment) increased in response to the pilot program, and we present
evidence that this increase is partly explained by the practice of participating itself, rather
than by improvements in quality.
1 Introduction
Public services - clinics, schools, and infrastructure - provide a fundamentally better life for billions
of people. Health care and access to clean water mean that a child is more likely to survive, roads
and infrastructure mean that her world will be more connected with the towns and villages around
her, and education can provide the tools to make informed decisions for herself, participate in the
democratic process, and lift herself and her family out of poverty. These services are important,
and the explosion in access to clinics, schools, roads and water in the last two decades represents
an unprecedented increase in the number of people who have access to basic public service in poor
countries.
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However, public service quality is often low, and in some cases getting worse as demand increases.
Poor quality can result from poor physicial infrastructure (such as crumbling roads with deep
potholes), lack of recurrent inputs (clinics which lack basic medicines or delays in teacher salary),
and ineﬀective or absent staﬀ (Chaudhury et al (2006) surveyed attendance in six countries and
found 19% of teachers absent during spot checks). Governments of poor countries must face the
issue of improving quality from a perspective of resource constraints, both ﬁnancial and in terms of
human resources. How might policymakers improve the quality of public services in settings with
resource constraints?
Recently, attention has increasingly turned to local beneﬁciary participation as a means to
improve service quality, in part because two other principal approaches, increasing inputs or in-
centivizing those who provide the service (such as doctors, teachers or nurses), have not been
as successful as hoped. The input-based approach, increasing inputs such as textbooks without
changing management, has had little impact on test scores in several randomized evaluations. The
incentive-based approach, paying doctors, teachers, or nurses based on attendance or ﬁnal outcomes,
is often unsuccessful and success seems to depend on context and enforceability.
Beneﬁciary participation in the service management may be a better option for three reasons.
First, the information problems that contribute to government failures are likely to be less acute at
the community level than at the central level. Second, communities have a stronger incentive to de-
mand high quality service than the central government, since they beneﬁt directly from that service,
whereas the central government beneﬁts only indirectly. These two ﬁrst reasons make beneﬁciary
participation likely to improve the quality of the service through a more eﬃcient monitoring of the
provider. Finally, beneﬁciary participation might increase uptake for the service on its own, regard-
less of quality improvements: in the case of education, parents who participate may gain logistical
information about the school (e.g. deadlines for registration or the possibility of reduced fees),
information on the returns to education, and information about school functioning which increases
conﬁdence in the school staﬀ. While making a decision about enrolling their children or not, these
informational gains would increase the beneﬁt that parents derive from enrolling their children.
Parental participation in school management can also help parent to overcome procrastination due
to present-biased preferences, and make them mor pro-active in their children's education. Under
both channels, beneﬁciary participation might increase enrollment, that is uptake for the service.
Program designers envision many diﬀerent kinds of beneﬁciary participation: beneﬁciaries might
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be organized into committees; undertake projects themselves, such as construction or sanitation;
fundraise; supervise, hire, and even ﬁre teachers; engage in awareness campaigns; or simply provide
advice to staﬀ. One problem that we shall consider in this paper is that these diﬀerent activities
imply diﬀerent requirements of skills, wealth and authority on the part of parents.
The extent to which participation can fulﬁll these expectations must depend on the willingness,
ability and resources of beneﬁciaries: it may be costly and time-consuming to gather local infor-
mation, and may be very diﬃcult in practice to put pressure on doctors, teachers, or nurses to
improve service quality. The extent to which beneﬁciaries will be able to surmount these diﬃculties
is likely to depend on the characteristics of the community and in particular the dynamics of the
relationship between the people who are beneﬁciaries and the person who is performing the service.
Nonetheless, the perception that the advantages of community participation will likely dominate
these obstacles is common among many who work in public service in developing countries. The
2004 World Development Report was devoted to the idea of putting the poor at the center of
service provision with the strong belief that giving parents voice over their children's education,
patients a say over hospital management, making agency budgets transparentall contribute to
improving outcomes in human development. Community-based management policies have been
widely adopted throughout Africa over the past decade, based mainly on experience gained in Latin
America. In countries including Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Uganda, and Burkina Faso, governments
and NGOs have organized citizens into thousands of local committees for schools, clinics, and
local infrastrucutre, and giving these committees varying levels of power over resource allocation,
monitoring, and management.
Despite the enthusiasm of policymakers for participation programs, the empirical question of
whether, and under what conditions, community participation can actually make services work
better remains unresolved. Programs to improve service provision from increasing participation
may fail at the ﬁrst stage of the process: Banerjee et al (2010) report that in one region in India,
people were not even aware of the existence of school committees, and providing information and
training to the community had no impact on involvement in schools. Olken (2007) found no impact
of community participation in reducing corruption on village road projects. On the other hand,
some studies show remarkable success of participation projects. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009)
found that community-based monitoring of health centers in Uganda dramatically increased the
quality and quantity of primary health care provision. In the particular case of parent participation
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in schools, which we consider here, the results are contradictory and suggest that the success of
participation programs is highly context dependent. Duﬂo, Dupas and Kremer (2009) found that
school committee monitoring of contract teachers (rather than civil servant teachers) was a key
factor for extra teachers to have a positive impact on student learning. Kremer and Vermeersch
(2005) do not ﬁnd any impact from encouraging school committees to monitor regular teachers,
since regular teachers are much more job-protected, and therefore powerful, than contract teachers.
This paper contributes to this literature by as follows. We construct a basic model which explains
why previous evaluations have found diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of community participation in
increasing the quality of public services. It suggests that the role of community participation is
likely to vary greatly depending on the context, and makes explicit the role of power imbalances
between the beneﬁciaries and the service provider. We consider diﬀerent types of school partici-
pation activities: managerial, supportive, and oppositional, and examine how diﬀerent community
characteristics might either support or hinder these diﬀerent types of participation. We then test
this model using data from a randomized evaluation of cash grants to school committees in Niger
intended to increase community participation and school quality. The evaluation was part of a pilot
project designed and implemented by the World Bank and the Nigerien Ministry of Education. We
use variables on parent participation, school functioning, and enrollment to test our predictions.
In particular, we test the impact of the grant on parental participation, quality, and demand for
schools with diﬀerent characteristics. We also test whether increased enrollment comes from quality
improvements or parental participation per se.
We ﬁnd an overall positive impact of the grant program on managerial and supportive actions
in all schools, and sub-group analysis supports some of the more detailed predictions of the model.
We ﬁnd that in situations where (i) the community has little authority relative to the school staﬀ
or (ii) the community and the school staﬀ share important social links, the community is rather
prompt to undertake managerial and supportive actions, but not oppositional actions, speciﬁcally
supervising teacher attendance. Only schools with high levels of parent education are in a position
to put pressure on teachers for improved quality. We also observe an increase in the demand
for education for young pupils. We argue that this supports the idea that increasing parental
participation in school management motivates enrollment, and we provide evidence that some part of
the increased enrollment is due to the practice of participation, rather than to quality improvements.
We ﬁnd mixed eﬀects on quality: improvements in school accountability and transparency, but no
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improvement of teacher eﬀort, consistent with the fact that most communities did not supervise or
sanction teachers. Note that the duration of the program may have been too short to observe great
changes in school quality.
There are two key policy implications of these ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that community partici-
pation programs are most eﬀective when local circumstances facilitate the kind of actions that the
community is to perform. Second, we ﬁnd support for the idea that the practice of participation
itself - irrespective of improvements to quality - can increase service uptake.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some background on where we stand
in our knowledge on the eﬀect of beneﬁciary participation. Section 3 presents a formal model of the
role of parent participation in improving school quality and increasing their demand for education.
Section 4 presents some background information on education in Niger, and then describes the
school grants experimental design and related research questions. Section 5 presents the data,
Section 6 our estimation strategy and Section 7 the empirical results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background on Participation
Improving public service quality is a critical challenge throughout the world, and is urgent in
developing countries, and programs to increase participation are frequently evoked as a solution.
Our paper is situated at the intersection of a growing literature on quality improvement and a
growing literature on beneﬁciary participation. In particular, our paper begins to make explicit an
undercurrent in much of the work on participation: how diﬀerent factors inﬂuence both the level of
participatory activity and its impact on quality.
Randomized evaluations of the impact of increasing inputs in schools have often given disap-
pointing results For example, Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (2009) ﬁnd no impact from a program to
increase textbooks; Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin and Zitzewitz (2004) ﬁnd no impact from ﬂip charts;
Banerjee et al. (2002) ﬁnd no impact from additional teachers in India; and Duﬂo, Dupas and
Kremer (2009) ﬁnd no eﬀect of decreasing the teacher-pupil ratio (absent other reforms) in Kenya.
In addition, randomized evaluations of programs to change provider's incentives have had mixed
results. Researchers have found improvements in outcomes when modest incentives have been given
to teachers by NGOs (Duﬂo, Hanna and Ryan, 2008; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2006). In
Kenya, teacher incentives implemented by head teachers had no impact because teachers received
the bonus irrespective of their real presence (Kremer and Chen, 2002). In India, incentives to nurses
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conditional on their attendance was initially very eﬀective, but it failed to have any impact after
six months when the local bureaucracy started providing oﬃcial excuses for most of the nurses'
absences (Banerjee, Duﬂo and Glennerster, 2008).
There are a handful of existing models of community participation. Khwaja (2004) formalizes the
ownership element of participation by modelling the interaction (planning and decision-making)
between the community and the donor in a particular project. Using data from Pakistan, he
demonstrates that community involvement in non-technical decisions can improve outcomes, while
community involvement in technical decisions can lead to worse outcomes. We focus on the impact
of ongoing participation on service quality (rather than participation in project decisionmaking
itself), and our model builds heavily on one model, given in Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2008),
where individuals within a community are members of one or more groups within that community.
Individuals then decide whether to participate in providing the public good based on their expected
beneﬁts (including the probablity that their group can capture the beneﬁts of the public good, which
is inﬂuenced by their own participation leven) and expected costs.
However, many potential barriers that can prevent beneﬁciary participation from improving
service quality. Communities may lack the necessary capacity to eﬀectively plan or monitor teachers
(Galiani et al, 2008), communities may be too fragmented along ethnic or other lines to work
together eﬀectively (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2008; Vidgor, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005;
Alesina and La Ferrarra, 2000), community participation programs may counterintuitively empower
local elites and enable resource capture (Olken, 2007; Reinnika and Svensson, 2004; Bardhan, 2002),
and the problems of free riding might be so extreme as to prevent collective action (Olson, 1965).
Evaluations of programs to increase beneﬁciary participation give mixed results and hint that
the success of a program is highly context-dependent. In Kenya, Duﬂo, Dupas and Kremer (2009)
found that parent participation in teacher monitoring was ineﬀective when the parents had little real
authority over the teacher due to civil servant status. The success of community-based monitoring
of health facilities in Uganda studied by Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) also ﬁts into this pattern.
Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) found community-based monitoring of health centers in Uganda to
be quite successful at improving health outcomes. In the Uganda case, participation took place in
large meetings, which we feel implies a lower social and individual cost of participation, and also
concerned a good (health care) which is of rather immediate concern to beneﬁciaries. Olken (2007)
also ﬁnds that traditional top-down monitoring - e.g. increasing government audits on village
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road projects - reduced corruption. However, bottom-up interventions were ineﬀective because
individuals tasked with enforcing punishments were themselves corruptible.
3 Model
In this section, we consider a very basic model that makes the determinants of the level of parent
participation in schools explicit, and considers how parent participation can determine quality of and
demand for education. Our model focuses speciﬁcally on parent participation in school functioning,
but it could be applied to other public services.
3.1 Set-Up
Parent Participation
We adapt the model of Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2008) to the case of schools, and we exclude
the possibility of competing groups within the community for simpliﬁcation. We adopt the general
view that participating involves costs and beneﬁts for parents and that parents do not coordinate,
and therefore parents choose the level of eﬀort that maximizes their individual payoﬀ.
The private beneﬁt from participation depends on the impact of parent i's eﬀort on school qual-
ity, the impact of other parents' eﬀorts on school quality, and on the beneﬁt from education itself.
The impact of eﬀort on school quality for given level of resources is represented by fi(ei), which we
call parent i's eﬃciency. Parents will be more eﬃcient if their eﬀort is more easily transformed into
improvements in school quality. We assume that fi(0) = 0 and that fi(.) might be either increasing
and concave (in cases where member i's eﬀort increases school quality) or decreasing and convex (in
cases where member i's eﬀort is counterproductive and decreases school quality, for instance when
meetings and questions from parents slow down the school management without improvements in
the management quality). Member i is said eﬀective when fi(.) is increasing, whereas ineﬀective
when fi(.) is decreasing; The beneﬁt from enrolling their children at school itself is denoted bi.
1
The private cost that parent i incurs from participating is denoted ci(ei), where ci(.) is increasing
and ci(0) = 0. We assume that ci(.) is convex, to reﬂect that the marginal cost of each unit of eﬀort
is increasing.
1Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2008) use the term bi(n), where n is the size of the community. The dependence
on n allows for possible congestion eﬀects which might reduce the per-member value of the public good as a community
gets larger. The authors acknowledge that constant beneﬁts across community size is a reasonable description of the
situation when the community is dealing with a school, a health center or a road, the case of a public (non-rival)
good.
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The net utility Ui for parent i is equal to
Ui(ei, e−i) = biu(fi(ei) +
∑
k 6=i
fk(ek))− ci(ei) (1)
where the gross utility function u(.) is increasing and concave, and the term u(fi(ei) +
∑
k 6=i
fk(ek)),
shows that gross utility depends on the individual's eﬃcacy and the eﬃcacy of others. While
choosing how much to participate, a parent will take into account their own eﬃciency, fi(ei), as well
as the eﬃciency of others,
∑
k 6=i
fk(ek), since what matters for them is the overall change in school
quality. The concavity of u(.) insures that parent participation eﬀorts are strategic substitutes,
capturing the fact that monitoring itself is also a public good and can give rise to free-riding issue
(note that we won't draw testable predictions related to this issue hereafter since we will focus on
a special case where parents are symetric).
We assume that parents have perfect information about their eﬃciency, fi(.), and the eﬃciency
of other parents, f−i(.). Moreover, we assume that parents derive no beneﬁt from participating
per se but only from the resulting improvement in school quality since u(.) is only associated
with parents' eﬃciency. One extension of this model might incorporate information problems,
where parents have incorrect beliefs about their own or other's eﬃciency; another extension could
incorporate direct beneﬁts from being involved (reputation, altruism), which we do not consider
here. These extensions would allow parents participation to have negative eﬀects on school quality
in the case where parents are ineﬃcient, which is not possible under our assumptions (see section
3.2).
School Quality
How would parental participation aﬀect the quality of education? Denote by school quality by Q .
We propose that Q is given by:
Q =
[
f0 +
∑
i
fi(ei)
]
G (2)
where G represents the total resources available to the school, f0 is the school staﬀ's eﬃcacy per
unit of resources, i.e. the ability of the school staﬀ to transform one unit of resources into school
quality (ignoring parent participation), and where fi(ei) is parent i's eﬃcacy per unit of resources,
as discussed above.
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In this analytical framework, school quality is the product of two factors: the total resources
available, G, and the eﬃciency of resource use,
[
f0 +
∑
i
fi(ei)
]
. Note that the eﬃciency factor is
likely to be small, since increasing G alone, with no changes to eﬃciency, has often been found to
be ineﬀective at improving school quality. The goal of parent participation programs is to increase
school quality by increasing the term
∑
i
fi(ei).
Demand for Education
How would parental participation aﬀect the demand for education? We do not explicitly model
demand for education, but we frame our thinking by the idea that parents consider the costs and
beneﬁts of enrolling their child in school (and making sure they attend), and if the net beneﬁt is
positive, they enroll their child. The beneﬁt of enrolling their child in school was already introduced
in the parental participation equation as bi. It will be determined by such elements as taste for
education and expected wage returns. The cost of enrolling their child in school would include both
the direct and indirect costs of school (uniform, supplies, opportunity costs of time spent at school),
as well as any potential psychological costs (for example, of sending girls to school when this is not
culturally accepted). Parents will choose to send their child to school as soon as the net beneﬁt is
positive.
Demand for education may then be increased either by increasing the beneﬁt to education
(for example, by increasing the taste for education or increasing the returns to education) or by
decreasing the cost (by reducing school fees and associated out of pocket costs, the diﬃculty of
enrolling in school, or opportunity cost of children's time). Demand for education may thus also be
increased by information about the beneﬁts of education, or by the conﬁdence that parents have in
the school staﬀ.
3.2 Characterization of the Solution for Participation Level
In equilibrium, member i chooses ei∗ that maximizes (1), taking e−i as given (Nash Equilibrium):
ei∗ = Argmax(U(ei, e−i)).
Ineﬀective members
This model excludes the possibility that parent participation could decrease the school quality: the
eﬀect of parent participation is at least positive, otherwise ineﬀective members would choose not
to participate.
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Proof: If fi(ei) ≤ 0 for all ei positive, then Ui(ei, e−i) ≤ Ui(0, e−i) for all given e−i. So
ei∗ = 0.
Eﬀective members
The ﬁrst order condition of the equilibrium eﬀort is given by
bif
′
i(ei)u
′(fi(ei) +
∑
k 6=i
fk(ek))− c′i(ei) = 0 (3)
from which the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort equalizes its marginal cost.
At this stage, it is not possible to formulate the best-reponse function without further assump-
tions. We do not attempt to derive the exact optimal level of eﬀort at the individual level, but
focus on characterizing the factors determining this optimal level and test how the optimal level
will vary with individual characteristics.
Communities
As we only consider school-level characteristics in our empirical test, we will make the simplifying
assumtion that agents are symetric, i.e. all parents in the same community have the same parameters
b, f(.) and c(.).
To conceptualize the variations of eﬃciency at monitoring in the community, we consider θ,
a parameter of eﬃciency, and write f(.) ≡ θl(.), where l(.) is a common technology of eﬃciency,
increasing and concave and such that l(0) = 0. Introducing θ allows us to consider diﬀerences in
eﬃciency without creating fundamental diﬀerences in the technology of transforming participation
into school quality. Similarly, we also introduce κ a parameter of cost and write cost of monitoring
as: c(.) ≡ κh(.), where h(.) a technology of cost, increasing convex and such that h(0) = 0.
Our objective is to characterize the variations of e∗ with b, θ and κ. Using equation (3) and the
assumption of symetric members in the community, e∗ solves:
bθl′(e)u′(nθl(e))− κh′(e) = 0 (4)
The implicit function theorem allows for deriving ∂e∂b ,
∂e
∂θ and
∂e
∂κ near the solution. The concavity
of u(.) and l(.), and the convexity of h(.), insure that ∂e∂b > 0,
∂e
∂θ > 0 and
∂e
∂κ < 0 (proof in
Appendix). Under classical assumptions about the utility, eﬃciency and cost functions, the optimal
level of parent participation increases with the beneﬁt from education quality and with eﬃciency,
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and decreases with the cost of participation.
Considering the second derivatives, we see that the eﬀect of increases in θ will be mediated by
the initial level of θ, as well as by b and κ: ∂
2e
∂b∂θ > 0,
∂2e
∂θ2 > 0 and
∂2e
∂κ∂θ < 0.
Under this simple model with minimal assumptions, in ineﬀective communities (where all parents
have decreasing eﬃciency functions, that is a negative θ), nobody will choose to participate. In
communities with eﬀective members, the level of participation will depend on the three parameters:
b, θ and κ. Finally, an shift in θ would produce an increase in the level of participation which would
vary with initial θ, b and κ.
3.3 Diﬀerent types of participatory actions
Parent participation may take many diﬀerent forms, and some types of actions may be easier to
undertake than others. We separate participatory actions into three categories:
Supportive actions are purely supportive of the school actions and policies, for example by
raising money or paying fees, or by carrying out actions under the authority of the school staﬀ.
Such actions do not put parents in opposition to school staﬀ, and they do not require any speciﬁc
ability.
Management actions are those where the parents act as agents of the school staﬀ in some capacity
which requires decision-making or management, but is neither purely supportive, nor oppositional.
These actions require basic literacy and may be time-consuming, for example keeping inventory of
school supplies, or planning a construction project.
Oppositional actions are those which put the community in opposition to the teachers. In
order to be eﬀective, these types of actions require that the community take (to some extent) an
adversarial position against the school staﬀ. One important action of this type is measuring and
demanding accountability for teacher attendance.
3.4 Characteristics of Communities that Determine the Equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the various characteristics that may determine, following our model, the
capacity of a community to improve the quality of the school. This is naturally not an exhaustive
list, but reﬂects the variables which are available.
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3.4.1 Taste
Taste for education is captured by the parameter b. In our empirical exercise, we use the proportion
of girls at school as a proxy for the taste for education. The justiﬁcation is that the gap in girl-boy
enrollment reﬂects parents' valuation of education. The decision of whether to send a child to
school is the result of parent-speciﬁc comparison of costs (school access, fees, opportunity cost of
boy's and girl's time, any disutility parents suﬀer because of cultural pressures against sending their
daughters to school) and beneﬁts (returns to education, and taste for education). We assume that
the majority of these parameters are similar for boys and girls: international experience indicates
that returns in terms of proportional increases to household and wage productivity generally do not
diﬀer appreciably by gender even when average wages or patterns of labor participation do (Schultz,
1995). In Niger, school fees do not vary by gender, and diﬀerence in the opportunity cost of a boy's
or girl's time, or any disutility parents suﬀer because of cultural pressures against sending their
daughters to school should be constant across communities. The diﬀerences in the gap in girl-boy
enrollment can then be attributed todiﬀerences in parents' taste for education: when parents have
a taste for education, the beneﬁts of sending the daughter to school dominate the costs, whereas
the costs dominate the beneﬁts when the parents do not have a taste for education. For this reason,
we expect the communities where the proportion of girls at school is high to have a higher taste for
education and therefore to participate more than the communities where this proportion is low.
3.4.2 Real Authority
As modelled by Aghion and Tirole (1997), formal authority (the right to make decisions) need
not imply real authority (eﬀective control over decisions). The real authority of parents over the
school is captured by the parameter θ. Parents with high θ are more eﬀective at participating (for
example, better able to monitor teachers), so in equilibrium they invest more eﬀort, and each unit
of eﬀort has a greater impact on school quality, than parents with a low θ. The characteristics that
we will use in our empirical framework to capture diﬀerences in real authority are the following.
Education Education may determine real authority in two ways. First, school committees with
more education are able to perform tasks that require basic literacy and numeracy, like record
keeping, accounting and reviewing school records. Second, education is an important determinant
of social status, especially in developing countries where the average education is very low and
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teachers are very respected members of the community.We deﬁne a community as educated if
one or both of the two interviewed members of the school committee completed primary school.
We expect educated communities to participate more and to be more eﬀective than non-educated
communities.
Wealth We assume that the wealthier a community is, the more real authority parents will
have because they will have a higher social status relative to the teachers (teachers are relatively
homogenous in terms of wealth). We therefore expect wealthier communities to participate more
and to be more eﬃcient than poorer communities. The wealth of school committee members is the
ﬁrst component of a principal component analysis of durable goods possessed by the two interviewed
school committee members and the school director. Durable goods include transportation means,
animals and housing equipment. The wealth of school committee is then the average of this wealth
index for the two interviewed school committee members.
Teacher Status Regular teachers are civil servants, and are protected by powerful national
unions: as such communities are generally unable to impose sanctions. Contract teachers, on
the other hand, have temporary contracts and might be more responsive to sanctions. Schools with
a high proportion of civil servant teachers should then have parents with lower real authority, and
thus lower eﬃciency and lower parent participation. We measure teacher status by determining the
percent of teachers in a school who are civil servants.
The seniority of the school director A brand new school director is likely to have less power
relative to the community than a school director who has been assigned to (and living in) the
community for many years. Parents in schools with senior school directors to participate less and
to be less eﬀective than those working with recent school directors. (As discussed below there may
be an eﬀect in the opposite direction). The seniority of school director is the number of years since
the school director has been in charge at this speciﬁc school.
3.4.3 Distance
Average distance of households from the school is likely to be an important ingredient of the
cost of participation, κ: distance implies both a direct cost (transportation) and an indirect cost
(opportunity cost of additional time spent in participating). A community where households are
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located far from the school should have lower participation when actions require transportation
(going to school for a meeting, visiting pupil parents, etc.). The distance variable we use is an
index between 1 and 5, 1 meaning that all students live within 3km from school, and 5 meaning
that all students live farer than 3km from school.
3.4.4 Social Proximity
Communities where the school staﬀ and the parent community share multiple social links have
higher social proximity. Participation levels are likely to depend on this closeness. The direction
of the impact is abiguous: social proximity or friendship could inﬂict a social cost on members
for oppositional actions (perhaps the personal relationship between a teacher and parent could
deteriorate), but high social proximity could also inﬂict a cost on parents for not participating
for actions that help or support the school staﬀ. The inﬂuence of social proximity on costs of
participation therefore depends on the kind of participatory actions: we expect social proximity to
increase participation . The size of κ reﬂects social proximity and the sign will be positive when
the participation requires opposition and negative when the participation requires support. The
characteristics that we will use in our empirical framework to capture diﬀerences in social proximity
are the following.
The seniority of the school director The seniority of the school director not only inﬂuence
parents' real authority, it may also inﬂuence social proximity between the community and the school
director: the more time s/he has been in charge, the more social ties between the school director
and the community. We therefore expect school committees working with senior school directors
to put in less eﬀort in oppositional actions / more eﬀort in supportive actions than those working
with recent school directors.
Common language between director and community Directors who speak the same lan-
guage as the community will likely have more social ties with the community, either because of
common origins, or because of ease of communication. By contrast, directors who do not speak
the same language as the community will probably have fewer social interactions with parents.
We therefore expect parents who speak the same language as their school director to participate
less in opposition actions and more in supportive actions than those working with school directors
speaking a diﬀerent language.
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4 Experimental Set-Up
4.1 Background on Education in Niger
Niger has made remarkable progress in education access in the last decade: the number of children
enrolled in primary school has more than doubled from 656,0000 in 2000 to 1,554,102 in 2008, and
gross enrollment has risen from 37% to 66% in the same period. However, only 44% of children
who begin primary school ﬁnish all grades, and only 43% of sixth graders who take the national
exam at the end of primary school succeed.
In 2006 the Ministry of Education in Niger introduced school committees in all primary public
schools in order to improve quality. These school committees (called the COGES) were designed
to implicate parents and community members in the school, improve accountability, improve man-
agement, and thus enhance access to and quality of education. As discussed in the introduction,
the establishment of local community groups for the purpose of improving public service provision
via community participation was a strategy that many country governments and civil society or-
ganizations were (and still are) advocating. In many respects, the circumstances of Niger make
a strong case for school-based management: low population density, vast distances and limited
transportation and information and communications infrastructure makes supervision of primary
schools by the central government (or its regional structures) very costly, and the transmission of
timely, local information to the central authorities for planning purposes is challenging.
These school committees consist of 6 representatives, including the school director, who serves
as secretary. School committees are supposed to be responsible for the management of personnel
resources (e.g. monitoring of teacher attendance and performance), ﬁnancial resources (e.g. school
meal funds) and material resources (e.g. purchase and management of textbooks, supplies etc.).
One of the school committee's central tasks is the drafting of an annual school improvement plan
that includes its projects, activities, budget, and timelines to guide its work for the school year.
The school committee works parallel to the Parent Association (APE), which includes all parents.
In 2006, a signiﬁcant number of the newly created school committees were not very actively
engaged in school matters, nor did they develop an school improvement plan for the school year.
To spur school committee involvement and activity, the Ministry of Education introduced school
grants in order to give the committees an incentive to meet, plan and undertake activities. The
grants were expected to improve school management through increased parental participation and
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accountability; to improve school infrastructure, and ultimately, enhance access to education; and
indirectly, the quality of education. The pilot project was carried out as a randomized evaluation
in order to provide reliable information on impact prior to national scale-up.
4.2 Experimental Design
The evaluation design included 1,000 randomly selected schools in two regions of Niger, Tahoua
and Zinder. One-thousand schools were randomly selected out of the 2,609 total public primary
schools in Zinder and Tahoua. Once these 1,000 schools were determined to be representative of
all the public primary schools in Zinder and Tahoua, half of the 1,000 schools, i.e. 500 schools,
were assigned to receive the grants and thus constituted the treatment group. Data from the
DSI Administrative School Census from 2005-2006 was used to conﬁrm balance between control
and treatment schools along various observable characteristics (data from 2006-2007 was not yet
available at the time of sampling in August 2007). Table 1 shows p-values for the test of equality
of means across control and treatment, from which we cannot reject any equality of means. . Both
randomizations stratiﬁed on inspection (a geographical administrative unit), existing support for
the school committee (e.g. from NGOs), and urban versus rural location. The other 500 schools
served as a control group.
The size of the grant was based on the size of the school (the number of classrooms), and the
average was US$209 per school, or US$2 per student. The school committees selected for treatment
received the grants in the last months of 2007 and ﬁrst months of 2008. The grants arrived in the
500 program schools in the amount allocated to each school, with a handful of exceptions. The grant
was a relatively modest amount that was determined by considerations of ﬁnancial sustainability
in view of a potential extension of the program by the government.
All 500 treatment schools (and school committees) received a general letter infor ming them
of the grant program and its objectives, and the grant amount allocated to their school. It also
included general guidelines on the use of the grants, but the speciﬁc project to be supported by the
grants was left open to the schools.2 One copy of this letter was distributed to the school director
and a second copy to the president of the school committee before the arrival of the grants. See
Annex for further information on compliance and program execution.
2One randomly selected group of schools recieved a slightly more restrictive list of potential expenditures, and
another group recieved a warning that their projects might be audited. Analysis of spending patterns did not show
any diﬀerence between these groups.
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4.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
This paper uses data collected during the evaluation of the school grants pilot project to test the
model discussed above.
Parent Participation
We interpret the randomly allocated grant as an exogenous shift in the eﬃciency parameter θ. The
intuition behind this is that increasing the resources under the ostensible control of the community
increases parent participation by increasing the eﬃciency of parents: parents have not only the
right to decide, but also a more eﬀective control over decisions thanks to the money that is under
their control. We therefore hypothesize that schools that received the grants will have higher levels
of all diﬀerent types of parent participation than schools that did not recieve the grants.
We deepen this analysis by investigating heterogeneous impacts. The intuition behind the sub-
group analysis is that the increase in participation in response to the grant is mediated by the
initial level of θ (real authority of parents prior to the grant program), as well as local b (parents'
perceived beneﬁt of enrolling their child in school) and local κ (cost of participating). The sample
size was chosen large enough to allow for testing for heterogenous treatment eﬀects along community
characteristics, one of our initial objectives with this the study. We hypothesize that the impact of
the grant on participation will depend on community characteristics.
One diﬃculty in testing the implications of the model for heterogeneous impacts is the possible
correlation between community characteristics that encourage participation (real authority, taste
for education) and those which discourage participation (costs). The potential correlations between
these characteristics make the identiﬁcation of the respective importance of each characteristic
diﬃcult. To identify the respective role of these characteristics, we take advantage of the diﬀerent
types of participatory actions: management actions, oppositional actions and supportive actions.
Some characteristics are important for some actions but not for others.
The only characteristic that should encourage parents to get involved in all actions, whatever
their nature, is the taste for education.
School Quality
We hypothesize that school quality could be positively aﬀected by the increase in participation
through the following causality chain: the increase in participation is expected to improve school
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management (meetings, fees collection, accounting, teacher supervision, etc.) and school account-
ability and management practices, and better management should increase teacher attendance and
eﬀort.
However, there are two caveats to the school quality analysis. First, the time elapsed between the
arrival of the grants and the collection of follow-up data was very short - less than one year. If parent
participation does lead to improved quality, this time may not have been suﬃcient for participation
to crystalize into quality improvement. Second, because the encouragement to participate in this
experiment takes the form of money, the treatment per se generates an increase in resources G.
Using our analytical framework, the diﬀerences in outcomes between treatment and control schools
might derive from an increase in G in addition to an increase in e and θ. This design therefore
uses resources and community-based monitoring as complement, with the limitation that it does not
allow for testing the complementariness itself.3 In this experiment, the results should be interpreted
as the impact of combining additional resources with increasing parent participation.
Demand for Education
As shown in the theoretical section, quality improvements could translate into an increase in the
demand for education through a shift in b. On the other hand, the practice of participation can also
induce a increase in the demand for education: better information about the beneﬁts of education,
or about the logistics of schools, or about the trustworthyness of teachers, can produce a shift in b.
The practice of participation may also make parents feel involved in their child's education and help
them to overcome procrastination due to present-biased preferences, with the idea that relationships
between parents and teachers serve as a commitment tool for parents, or that parental participation
might also make parents feel that they themselves are valuable in the education of their children
4. Alternatively, some schools may have reduced fees in response to the grant (though the data
3To do so, the ideal experimental design would have been to give grants to school committees in the treatment
group, and to give the exact same grants to school directors in the control groups. With such a design, the only
diﬀerence between treatment and control schools would have come from community participation. However, the
grants were small (on average $209 per school, $2 per student) so the increase in resources per se is unlikely to induce
important improvement in school quality. As a comparison, the textbook experiment in Kenya provided schools with
grants of 2.65$ per pupil and did not have any impact on educational outcomes (learning, enrollment and dropouts)
(Glewwe and al., 2009). The extra-teacher program in Kenya, dividing the pupil-teacher ratio from 82 to 43 on
average with a cost of 18$ per pupil per year, did not have any impact on educational outcomes in the absence of
any other changes (Duﬂo and al., 2009). (The authors report that the cost of a regular teacher is 120$ per month,
which mulitplied by 12 (months) and divided by 80 (students) gives the price per student per year). More generally,
impact evaluations converge to a consensus that providing extra resources has no impact on education outcomes (see
Glewwe and Kremer, 2006, for a review).
4This hypothesis echoes the recent ﬁndings of a ﬁeld experiment in France which aimed at getting parents more
informed about schools and more involved through parental meetings at school (Avvisati et al., 2010): the authors
ﬁnd that parents were prompt to increase their participation into schools and that this leads to substantial decrease
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indicate this did not happen on average), which could reduce the cost of enrolling pupils and thus the
overall beneﬁt from education. It is also possible that some school committees undertook student
recruitment projects funded through the grant. For example, some schools did radio campaigns
to register the grade 1 age relevant population for school. Another possibility is that parents
anticipate an increase in the quality of education due to school committee empowerment and send
their children ahead of such an improvement, which we cannot exclude.
5 Data
5.1 Data Sources
Data come from two sources: (i) administrative data on primary schools (the annual school census,
also called DSI administrative data) and (ii) an evaluation survey administered to school staﬀ
and two members of the school committee at treatment and control schools. The Ministry of
Education in Niger administers an annual census of all primary schools, including community
schools and medersas. Data on enrollment, teacher characteristics, school facilities and resources,
school performance, and community characteristics is collected via a written school self-administered
questionnaire sent to the schools by and returned to the Ministry. In addition to the administrative
data, the Ministry and the World Bank worked with a local NGO to prepare a detailed school survey
to be administered in April/May 2008 to understand the eﬀects of the grant. This questionnaire
included information on school infrastructure and resources, pupil enrollment and attendance, school
improvement plan, school committee functioning and membership, and school activities. It also
asked detailed questions about the level of education, personal wealth, and ethnicity of the school
committee members and turnover of school committee membership.
There is some attrition in both of these datasets. Each year, a handful of schools do not return
the administrative data questionnaire, or the questionnaires are improperly ﬁlled out, leading to
missing data. The evaluation survey was conducted on the basis of unnannounced visits, which
meant that many schools were closed. In addition, some schools were not visited due to security
concerns, and still others closed early that year because the summer rainy season began early and
so many children went to the ﬁelds with their parents to plant.
See Annex for descriptive statistics.
in student absenteism and lack of discipline.
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5.2 Participation
To draw general conclusions about the experiment's impact, and to guard against cherry-picking
of results, we present ﬁndings for indices that aggregate information over multiple treatment eﬀect
estimates. The aggregation improves statistical power to detect eﬀects that go in the same direction
within a domain. The summary index Y is deﬁned to be the equally weighted average of z-scores
of its components, with the sign of each measure oriented so that more beneﬁcial outcomes have
higher scores. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing
by the control group standard deviation. Thus, each component of the index has mean 0 and
standard deviation 1 for the control group5. The resulting estimate gives location of the mean of
the treatment group in the distribution of the control group in terms of standard deviation units.
We create two indices based on the insights from the model, in particular that diﬀerent pa-
rameters may impact diﬀerent kinds of participation. The management index averages together
seven variables reﬂecting parents and school committee involvement in actions that imply taking
some responsibility for school management: frequency of parents association and school committee
meetings, whether the mothers' association is active, and whether the school committee is in charge
of collecting fees, deciding how fees are spent, supervising infrastructure, and supervising supplies.
The supportive index averages together four variables reﬂecting parental support: parental ﬁnancial
and in-kind contributions, parent supervision of pupil attendance, and parent remedial action for
pupil absenteeism. These actions are those where the parents are not making any decisions about
school management or entering into (potential) conﬂict with the teachers, but rather are helping
the school staﬀ execute the management decisions.
The oppositional actions are testes separately since we observe only two variables: supervising
teacher attendance and sanctioning teachers. In these cases, the community members's interest and
school staﬀ's interests are clearly misaligned.
5.3 Demand for Education
We measure demand using dropouts reported at the April/May 2008 questionnaire and the change
in enrollment from fall 2008 to fall 2009 reported to the Ministry of Education (by class).
5If an individual has a valid response to at least one component measure of an index, then any missing values for
other component measures are imputed at the random assignment group mean. This results in diﬀerences between
treatment and control means of an index being the same as the average of treatment and control means of the
components of that index (when the components are divided by their control group standard deviation and have no
missing value imputation), so that the index can be interpreted as the average of results for separate measures scaled
to standard deviation units.
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5.4 Quality of Education
We measure school quality using teachers' and director's presence at the unnannounced April/May
2008 questionnaire visit, whether the school was open on the day of the visit, and eight diﬀerent
measures of accountability: whether minutes were taken in the last school committee and par-
ent meeting, existence of written school action plan, and registers for material inventory, pupil
attendance, inspector visits, weekly activities, and teacher attendance.
We also create a material quality index using the number of buildings, desks, blackboards, books,
and latrines, the presence of a wall around the school compound and access to water.
6 Empirical Strategy
6.1 Local Average Treatment Eﬀect
We ﬁrst estimate intent-to-treat eﬀects as measured by the diﬀerences in the means of school
outcomes between schools initially assigned to the treatment group and schools initially assigned
to the control group. Let T be an indicator for treatment group assignment and let X be a matrix
of stratiﬁcation variables. Estimation of the intent-to-treat eﬀect β is from the following equation:
Yj = βTj +Xjγ + εj (5)
where Yj is the outcome of school j. The covariates (X) are included to improve estimation
precision and include whether the school is urban, the total proportion of girls in 2007/08, the
total enrollment in 2007/08, whether the school was supported by an outside NGO in 2006/07, and
the inspection (a geographic/administrative unit). All regressions use robust standard errors. The
absolute magnitudes of the outcomes are in units of outcome's standard deviation, so the estimate
shows the treatment eﬀect in terms of standard deviation units over the control group. We use this
equation to estimate the impact of the grant pilot program on parent participation, school quality,
and demand for education.
6.2 Heterogenous Treatment Eﬀects Along Community Characteristics
In the second step, we estimate intent-to-treat eﬀects with an interaction term to determine whether
the average treatment eﬀect varies according to the predictions of our model. We run regressions
of the form:
21
Yj = βTj + θCj × Tj + σCj +Xjγ + εj (6)
where Cj denotes a characteristic of the community that is expected to change the impact of
the grant program on the outcome variables.
Since some of these characteristics are correlated with one another, we check that the estimate of
the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is not driven by other characteristics by adding the correlated
characteristics and the corresponding interactions as additional covariates as soon as the correlation
between the characteristics is above 0.1. Finally, we include an indicator for urban schools and the
interaction of this indicator with the treatment assignement for each characteristic whose correlation
with being located in an urban area is above 0.1, to disentangle the eﬀect of this characteristic from
the eﬀect of being located in an urban area. Being located in an urban area is actually (though not
highly) correlated with some of our community characteristics of interest so we make sure to rule
out an urban eﬀect.
6.3 Identifying Channels of Impact
We generate evidence on channels of impact by including the potential channel in the regression of
treatment on the outcome, and observing the change in the coeﬃcient on treatment. We estimate
the following equation:
Yj = β2Tj + φCj +Xjγ + εj (7)
where Cj is the channel variable, and compare β2 to β generated by equation (5). A reduction
in the point value for β when the channel variable is included is evidence that some of the variation
in Yj which was due to variation in Tj is accounted for by the variation in Cj . Put diﬀerently, a
reduction in the coeﬃcient on treatment when the channel variable is added is consistent with the
hypothesis that some of the impact ﬂows through that channel.
7 Results
7.1 Eﬀect of Grants on Community Participation in Monitoring Schools
We ﬁnd that communities are ready to undertake supportive and managerial actions, but have
more diﬃculty with oppositional actions. Community characteristics exhibit some inﬂuence on
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community participation in ways that are consistent with our model, although the estimates are
often imprecise and conﬁrm only some of our predictions.
Supportive Actions Table 7 shows the impact of grants on community participation in support-
ive actions. The overall eﬀect of grants is that parents increased their support to school activities.
The mean of the treatment group is 0.14 standard deviations above the mean of the control group
for the index of supportive actions.6
The impact is larger when the school committee is educated and when the proportion of girls at
school is high, which is consistent with our view that the taste for education increases the beneﬁts to
education and thus participation. When the school committee is educated parents are 9 percentage
points more likely to make in-kind contributions to school in the treatment group than the control
group.
The impact is somewhat smaller when families live farther from school (Column (7)). The de-
tailed analysis reveals that distance from school actually decreases the likelihood that the community
supervises pupil attendance and takes remedial actions for pupil absenteeism (usually visiting and
talking to parents), which, since these actions require traveling to the school or to households, is
consistent with our predictions about how cost (travel time) enters into the decision to participate.
We do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in impact by common language, director seniority, teacher status,
or wealth.
Management Actions The impact of grants on parent participation in management actions is
reported in Table 4. The overall eﬀect of grants on the index of management actions is positive:
the mean index of the treatment group is about 0.10 standard deviations above the mean of the
control group, depending on the speciﬁcation. The analysis of detailed variables composing the
index shows a 27% increase in the proportion of school committees in charge of collecting fees (from
30% to 38%), or a 18% increase in the proportion of parental association in activity (from 27% to
32%). The eﬀect on the frequency of parental association and school committee meetings and on
the responsability of infrastructure is lower: a ﬁve percent increase.
The average treatment eﬀect does not vary with community characteristics, whereas our pre-
diction was a higher response from educated school committees and from communities with a taste
6The analysis of detailed variables composing this index (results not shown) show that most of this overall eﬀect
comes from an increase in parental contributions to schools, which is 0.48 standard deviations higher in the treatment
group than in the control group (293 FCFA in the control group versus 567 FCFA in the treatment group).
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for education.
Oppositional Actions Consistent with the model, only communities where the school commit-
tees were educated increased their participation in oppositional actions (Table 5) (there is no overall
impact). Teacher supervision is 0.14 standard deviations higher in the treatment group over the
control group when the school committee is educated (the proportion of school committees super-
vising teacher attendance went up from 74% in the control group to 80% in the treatment group).
The interactions of the treatment with the wealth of school committee and with the proportion of
girls at school exhibit positive (though not signiﬁcant) coeﬃcients, which is consistent with the role
of real authority and taste for education in community involvement; note also the negative (but not
signiﬁcant) coeﬃcients on the interactions with the fact that the school director speaks the same
language than the community, a proxy of social cost, and the distance from school, a proxy of direct
cost.
Table 6 shows that the school committees in the treatment group were not more able to undertake
remedial actions against teachers than in the control group. Again, the coeﬃcients on education of
the school committee, wealth of the school committee and the proportion of civil servant teachers,
which reﬂect real authority, are consistent with our predictions, though not signiﬁcant.
7.2 Eﬀects of Grants on School Quality
We ﬁnd the grant improved the material quality of schools of a small amount, and we ﬁnd modest
evidence for improvement in school managerial quality in terms of accountability and transparency,
but no improvement in teacher attendance. The lack of an impact on teacher eﬀort is in line with the
fact that very few of the schools undertook any sort of teacher supervision. The negative coeﬃcient
is unexpected. Feedback from the ﬁeld revealed that the 2007-2008 school year was particularly
bad in terms of strikes and teacher absenteism due to an exceptional delay in salary payments. It
is possible that teachers in the treatment group may have felt particularly resentful of the delay
since they knew of a cash lump sum transfer to their school. While it is not possible to test or
conﬁrm this hypothesis, it is reasonable to suspect that 2007-2008 was a year with a particular set
of political events that may make this speciﬁc impact not generalizable. We ﬁnd an overall increase
in the use of registers for fee collection and spending. Other impacts on quality are not consistent
across speciﬁcations (Table 8).
We ﬁnd a small impact on (0.05 standard deviations) on the index for material quality. This
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is largely driven by increases in the number of classrooms, the construction of walls around the
compound, and increased access to running water.7
7.3 Eﬀects of Grants on Demand for Education
The grant program increased demand for education for young children. Table 10 reports the impact
of grants on pupil enrollment (top-half) and on pupil dropouts (bottom-half). Younger pupils
exhibit fewer dropouts at the end of 2007-2008 for pupils in Grade 1 (though the decrease in
dropout is not signiﬁcant for girls), and fewer dropouts for girls in Grade 2. The decrease in
dropouts represents 0.17 standard deviations, which means a decrease of two percentage points
from a dropout rate of three percent (a 66 percent decrease). These ﬁndings are supported by a
separate dataset from the national oﬃce of statistics (Division de la Statistique et de l'Information)
which shows higher enrollment in 2008-2009 in Grade 2 for both boys and girls. The increase in
enrollment represents 0.10 standard deviations, which means an increase of 1.5 students in Grade
2 from an enrollment of 12 pupils (a 12.5 percent increase). The grant thus increased retention for
the youngest pupils.
7.4 Channels of impact on demand
Table 11 reports the test for channels of the impact on demand, with two competing channels: prat-
ice of participation versus quality improvements. We test for the practice of participation channel
using an index of participation which is simply a combination of the supportive and managerial
indices; we test for the quality improvement channel using the index of material quality. The out-
come is the number of pupils enrolled in second grade in the fall of 2009. The sample is restricted to
observations that have data for both potential channels. The column (1) reports the regression of
enrollment on treatment alone8. The column (2) reports the regression of enrollment on treatment
and the participation channel. The column (3) reports the regression of enrollment on treatment
and the material quality channel. Finally, the column (4) reports the regression of enrollment on
treatment and both the participation and the material quality channels.
The ﬁrst pair of columns shows that when the participation index is added to the regression of
enrollment, the coeﬃcient on treatment drops from 0.0899 standard deviations signiﬁcant at the
7These three items were also projects that were frequently reported by the schools on a detailed ﬁnancial ques-
tionnaire which was administered to a sub-sample of treatment schools.
8This is slightly diﬀerent from the previous estimate of the impact of treatment on enrollment because the sample
is restricted to schools that have data on participation and material quality.
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10% level to 0.0721 and non-signiﬁcant (a 20 percent decrease in point estimate). On the contrary,
adding the material quality index shows a much less important drop from 0.0899 to 0.0883 (a 2
percent decrease in point estimate), with no change in signiﬁcance. Including both channels together
yields the same results.
These results suggest that the increase in demand is ﬂowing from the increase in parental
participation in school activities and not from the increase in material quality. We are not able to
distinguish the pure informational eﬀect (better informed parents get a larger beneﬁt of enrolling
their child) and the psychological eﬀect (involved parents have less problems with procrastination
and are more pro-active) of participating. Yet, this result highlights that parental participation
in school increases demand for education regardless of quality improvements. Such a policy can
therefore pursue two independent objectives: improving quality of schools (which is not obvious
when parents are not in a position to oppose to teachers), and increasing the demand for education
(which is less demanding in terms of prerequisites of community characteristics).
8 Conclusion
This paper constructs a simple model of parent participation in schools, and uses data to test
the predictions of the model. Building on previous research on community-based monitoring of
public services, the model clariﬁes and makes explicit the circumstances under which participation
increases quality. We identiﬁed diﬀerent kinds of participatory actions (management actions, sup-
portive actions, and oppositional actions) and considered how diﬀerent community characteristics
might enable, or hinder, diﬀerent types of actions.
We tested this model using evidence from a pilot grant program in Niger, and found that
the program increased participation along several dimensions. We ﬁnd support for some, but not
all, predictions of the model. In particular, communities are ready to engage in activities that
support the school and help the school staﬀ manage the school, but parents, except those who are
educated, have much more diﬃculty taking actions that directly oppose the teachers. Our ﬁndings
on management quality are inconsistently positive, and we ﬁnd a small but signiﬁcant improvement
in material quality. We ﬁnd increases in the demand for education which we attribute to the practice
of participating, and support this channel by showing that participation accounts for at least some
of the variation in demand induced by treatment, while improvements to infrastructure account for
almost none.
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Possibilities for further work are two-fold. First, this model could be tested using alternative
data sources (many empirical surveys have been carried out on participation programs in diﬀerent
sectors). Second, this model might be adapted to give a more complete picture of the dynamics
behind participation. In particular, it may be interesting to account for information problems,
more subtil beneﬁts from participating as reputation or altruism, and free-riding. It would also be
interesting to make explicit the feedback between participation and demand, and to try to unpack
how feelings of ownership might enter into the community dynamics.
We ﬁnd that a program of providing grants to primary schools in order to catalyse community
participation was eﬀective. Extrapolating from the speciﬁc case of schools, there are two major
policy implications of this paper. First, the type of participation envisioned by the program should
match the characteristics of the community, and in particular the power dynamics in the relationship
of the person providing the public service and the people beneﬁting from it. This is, to some extent,
obvious to anyone who has worked on such programs, however this paper provides an empirical basis
for this assertion. In particular, it is likely to be unrealistic to ask parents to monitor teachers in
situations of asymmetries of power. Second, the evidence in this paper supports the idea that the
act of participation itself can increase uptake of services, irregardless of improvements in quality,
perhaps through increased familiarity with the public service institution. However, as this paper
does not include any cost/beneﬁt analysis (and note that any such analysis would need to take into
account the opportunity cost of the parents' time, as well as the other beneﬁts to participation
which are not considered in this paper), we do not speculate as to whether participation programs
in general are likely to be cost-eﬀective.
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9 Annex: Compliance with Study Protocol
The school committees, i.e. two representatives, signed a document conﬁrming eﬀective receipt
of the grant in the intended amount. These receipts were ﬁrst collected at the regional level and
the information was then entered into a database at the Ministry of Education as a way to verify
the actual receipt of the grants at the school level. An additional survey was conducted in 85
randomly selected schools asking detailed questions about the receipt and spending of the grants,
and ﬁnancial management. This questionnaire also included information about any problems with
the administration of the grant and qualitative feedback and suggestions from the COGES. The
use of the grants was recorded in detail, including the existence of a receipt for each expenditure.
The collection of grant receipts revealed that the grants arrived in the 500 program schools in
December 2007-January 2008 in the amount allocated to each school, with a handful of exceptions.
Data from the qualitative questionnaire administered at these visits indicate that the majority of
those schools received the intended grant amount9. The school committees used the grants in a
variety of ways. The most common use was material inputs such as construction and oﬃce supplies,
and other uses included investment projects, health and sanitation projects, and transportation.
Overall, the largest share of spending of the grant was in construction. Construction activities
included building classrooms, but communities also constructed lodging for teachers, latrines, school
enclosures, and other buildings. Twelve out of 84 schools, or 14% of schools surveyed, used at least
part of the grant to make loans either to parents, the director, or to the AME at some interest rate,
or purchasing grain for re-sale. It is unclear whether the loans or small business projects have been
proﬁtable.
The program was originally intended to last three years (with three cycles of grant disbursement).
Due to coordination problems and issues with the ﬁnancial transfer mechanism at the central
level, the project was terminated after only one year. This paper uses data collected to serve as
intermediate indicators.
9Among the 85 schools randomly chosen for the ﬁnancial questionnaire, one school that had been selected for
the grant had been closed at the time that the grant arrived. In another case, the grant was accidentally given to
another school. In a third case, a school reported receiving 500 FCFA less than the intended amount. Two schools
reported paying some money to cover transport costs to the person who delivered the grant.
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10 Annex: Data and Descriptive Statistics
Only the control group schools are used to generate the following descriptive statistics in this section,
with the objective for these statistics to be indicative of the pre-grant status of schools in Tahoua
and Zinder.
10.0.1 Parent Participation
On average, the school committee's last meeting occured 2.65 months before the survey, whereas
parental association's last meeting occured 3.69 months before the survey, which suggests a higher
activity of school committees than parental associations. More than half of school committees are
responsible for management tasks : 60% of school committees are responsible for school stationary
supplies and more than 70% are in charge of teaching materials and infrastructure. Three quarters
(77%) of school committees monitor the presence and punctuality of teachers and pupils, but only
two thirds (66%) have taken some kind of action against a pupil for absenteeism (pupil remedials),
and only one third (33%) have taken some kind of action against a teacher for absenteeism (teacher
remedials). Remedial teacher actions include talking to the teacher, warning the teacher, or com-
plaining to the teacher's supervisor. A third of school committees (30%) are in charge of collecting
contributions for the school, whereas a large majority of school committees (71%) are responsible
for managing expenditure of the fees. Parents participate in providing resources to schools: the
average parental contribution is 293 FCFA (about 59 US cents). In 84% of schools the community
provided in-kind contributions (such as food, building materials, or labor) to the school.
10.0.2 School Quality
Teacher presence Observed absenteeism among teachers is very high. On the day of the
unannounced survey visit, 10% of schools were closed (the visit was carried out on a day the
school was supposed to be open). Of schools that were open, 16% of school directors were absent,
and 18% of teachers were absent.10To accurately represent the loss of classroom time and avoid
reporting inconsistencies, this ﬁgure includes both excused and unexcused absences. Surveyors asked
respondents at the school about the reasons for teacher absences. In about one third of schools, no
reason was given. The fact that school committee members did not/could not indicate the reasons
for teacher absenteeism is cause for concern, since it may indicate a lack of or weak attention to
10This ﬁgure is in line with observed absenteeism rates in other countries; see Chaudhury et al (2006) which
surveyed attendance in six countries and found 19% of teachers absent during spot checks.
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teacher management and supervision. Among schools which provided reasons for teacher absences,
the most frequently cited reasons were (i) collecting salaries (34%); (ii) strike (33%); and (iii) illness
(19%).
Accountability and Transparency While most schools claim to keep registers for fundraising
and expenses, only about half were actually able to produce registers to be seen by the interviewers.
Over half of schools, 59% of school committees and 52% of parent associations, took minutes in
the last meeting. The annual school improvement plan, seen by many as the key activity of the
school committees, was able to be produced for inspection in 60% of schools. Recordkeeping varies
substantial by subject matter: 89% of schools use a register for material inventory, 66% to record
pupil attendance, and 52% for inspector's visits, whereas only 22% use a register to record weekly
activities and 17% use a register to record teacher attendance.
10.0.3 Demand for education
We use data on pupil enrollment at the beginning of the school year in 2008-2009 from administrative
data as an outcome variable, whereas dropouts and attendance are from the survey visit at the end
of the 2007-2008 school year. Overall, 156 pupils registered per school in 2008-2009. Attendance is
measured by the ratio of pupils present the day of survey visit by the number of pupils who were
registered at the beginning of the school year. An average of 69% of pupils who were enrolled at the
beginning of the school year were present at school the day of visit, though this measure is based
on a head count and thus may confound absence and drop out. Schools reported that about 3.4%
of pupils who were registered at the beginning of the school year dropped out over the course of
the year, or about 5 pupils per school on average. The dropout rate is highest in grade 6, at 5%.
The dropout rate is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across boys and girls.
10.0.4 Community Characteristics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the community characteristics we use as interactions with
the treatment variable to test for heterogenous treatment eﬀects of the program. These statistics
are from the 2008 school survey. It is highly unlikely that these characteristics changed because
of the treatment over the experiment period (December 2007-May 2008), either by construction or
because the evaluation period is only in the short run (we tested for diﬀerences of the means across
groups to conﬁrm balance over groups, and p-values are reported in Table 2). They can therefore
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be used as interaction variables.
The proportion of pupils who are girls is on average 39%. This measure is calculated from the
pupil registers made at the beginning of the school year. The standard deviation is 0.11, which
indicates some heterogeneity across communities. 10% of schools have a proportion of girls below
23%, whereas 10% have a proportion of girls above 50%.
Only 38% of school committees in the sample contain at least one member who completed
primary school, which indicates an important heterogeneity across communities. Note that there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in school committee members' seniority across control and treatment groups,
which indicates that the composition of school committee did not react to the grant program in the
short run. Note that the average wealth index does not have any material meaning in itself since the
scale is one that measures individual's wealth relative to one another. The average wealth index is
negative since the two school committee members are poorer, on average, than the school directors,
whose data was included in the construction of the wealth index. The standard deviation of this
wealth indicator is large (1.46), indicating an important heterogeneity of wealth across communities.
A minority (20%) of teachers in the average school are civil servants. Heterogeneity is large:
42% of schools have no civil servants and 35% have more than one third civil servants. Only 3% of
schools have a majority of civil servant teachers. The typical school director has been in his or her
position for 4 years. The variation of school director's seniority is not very large, with a standard
deviation of 2.68 years. A very small fraction (6%) of school directors have been in charge for only
one year, while 28% have been in charge for ﬁve years or more. In 82% of schools, the director
speaks the same language as the majority of people in the community, as measured by a dummy
equal to one when there is a common language.
The average distance index is 1.2, meaning that the typical community lives almost entirely
within 3 km from school (in 77% of schools, all students living within 3 km of the school). One-ﬁfth
(20%) of schools have a signiﬁcant share of students living more than 3 km from school, indicating
a sparse population. Note that pupils in the control schools tend to be closer to the community
than pupils in the treatment schools (signiﬁcant at the 10% level), although this diﬀerence is very
small.
There is therefore heterogeneity in these characteristics across communities, which will help to
identify the circumstances under which community participation to school monitoring works. The
heterogeneity is limited: the context of this study is characterized by low real authority of the
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parents (low education and wealth) and rather high social proximity between the provider and the
community (teachers most often speak the same language as the majority of the population).
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Figure 1: Reported Use of Grant Money, by Total Amount Spent
Source: Financial Control over 85 randomly selected schools
Table 1: Pre-program School Characteristics, by Treatment Group
Variable Treatment Control P-value 
    
Observations 500 500   
    Enrollment 
   Pupils 121.74 120.96 0.9 
Girls 46.08 46.01 0.98 
% Girls 37.75 38.12 0.62 
    Infrastructure 
   Teachers 3.13 3.15 0.88 
Classrooms 2.88 2.95 0.63 
Latrines 0.16 0.17 0.93 
Water 0.1 0.08 0.41 
Electricity 0.01 0.01 0.97 
    Test scores 
   Grade 6 exam success rate 0.69 0.71 0.48 
    School Committees 
   School committee exists 0.91 0.93 0.22 
Supported 0.58 0.59 0.85 
    Accessibility  
   Distance to inspection 36.41 36.27 0.94 
Distance to health Center 8.97 8.46 0.71  
    Source: 2005-2006 Administrative Data 
  Notes: School averages. P-values are for tests of equality of the means across 
groups. 
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Table 2: Community Characteristics, by Treatment Group
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. Control Treatment  p‐value 
             
Proportion of girls in 2007‐2008  984  0.39  0.11  0.39  0.39  0.93 
Whether at least one member in the school committee completed  
primary education  599  0.38  0.49  0.39  0.38  0.67 
Proportion of civil servant teachers per school  766  0.2  0.21  0.2  0.2  0.99 
Seniority of school director in the school (years)  721  4.16  2.68  4.22  4.1  0.53 
Distance of households from school (index from 1 to 5)  768  1.22  0.49  1.19  1.25  0.07 
Wealth of school committee relatively to the school director (pca index) 718  ‐0.63  1.46  ‐0.59  ‐0.67  0.42 
Whether school director speaks the same language as the community  709  0.82  0.39  0.82  0.81  0.7 
Whether the school is urban  1000  0.11  0.31  0.11  0.11  0.92 
                    
Source: 2008 school survey             
Notes: School averages. P‐values are for tests of equality of the means across groups.         
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Pupil Enrollment, Retention and Attendance
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Pupil Enrollment in 2008‐2009
Grade 1 500 18 16 22 19 40 33
Grade 2 500 12 15 17 19 30 32
Grade 3 500 9 12 14 17 24 27
Grade 4 500 10 12 16 17 26 27
Grade 5 500 8 10 13 15 21 23
Grade 6 500 7 9 12 13 19 21
Total 493 66 57 95 71 156 116
Source: 2008‐2009 Administrative Data. School averages in the control group. 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Pupil Dropouts Rate in 2007‐2008
Grade 1 276 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,1
Grade 2 231 0,04 0,14 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,11
Grade 3 272 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,08
Grade 4 242 0,04 0,13 0,03 0,11 0,04 0,11
Grade 5 214 0,04 0,13 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,1
Grade 6 238 0,05 0,14 0,05 0,11 0,05 0,1
Total 386 0,04 0,09 0,03 0,08 0,03 0,08
Pupil Attendance in 2007‐2008
Boys attendance  328 0,53 0,31
Girls attendance 328 1,06 0,69
Total attendance 331 0,69 0,29
Source: 2008 School Survey. School averages in the control group. 
Girls Boys Total
Girls Boys Total
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Table 3 (continued): Descriptive Statistics - Community Involvement and School Management
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Community Involvement
Parental contributions per pupil 312 293,48 500,66
Whether the community provides help in kind 379 0,84 0,37
Pupil supervision 377 0,77 0,31
Pupil remedials 311 0,66 0,47
Time since last parent meeting (in months) * 236 ‐3,69 2,19
Time since last school committee meeting (in months) * 277 ‐2,65 1,56
School committee in charge of collecting fees 206 0,3 0,46
School committee in charge of spending fees 206 0,71 0,45
School committee in charge of infrastructure 379 0,74 0,44
School committee in charge of furnitures 380 0,6 0,49
Active parental association 434 0,27 0,45
Teacher supervision 380 0,77 0,3
Teacher remedials 380 0,33 0,47
School Accountability and Recordkeeping
Whether the school produced the register for fees collection  314 0,49 0,5
Whether the school produced the register for fees expenses  309 0,48 0,5
Whether the school uses a register for pupil attendance 311 0,66 0,47
Whether the school uses a register for teacher attendance 375 0,17 0,37
Whether the school uses a register for inspector's visits 388 0,52 0,5
Whether the school uses a register for material inventory 368 0,89 0,28
Whether the school uses a register for weekly activities 391 0,22 0,41
Whether the school produced an improvement plan 371 0,6 0,49
Whether minutes exist for the last school committee meeting 372 0,59 0,49
Whether minutes exist for the last parent meeting 367 0,52 0,5
Frequency of minutes for school committee meetings 354 0,62 0,45
Frequency of minutes for parent meetings 332 0,58 0,48
Teacher effort
Proportion of present teachers 385 0,82 0,29
Whether school director is present 399 0,84 0,37
Whether school is open 405 0,9 0,31
Source: 2008 School Survey. School averages in the control group. 
* Time since the last meeting is negative to reflect the fact that more time since the last meeting is negative 
in terms of community involvement. ‐3,69 means that the last meeting occured 3,69 months ago.   
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Table 4: The Impact of Grants on Community Participation to School Management
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) 0.0840*** 0.0903*** 0.173*** 0.0882* 0.101** 0.107*** -0.00287 0.0778
0.0271 0.0322 0.0604 0.0502 0.0399 0.0383 0.0787 0.108
T*Wealth of school com. 0.00812
0.0319
T*Director same language -0.0363
0.0266
T*Director seniority -0.00285
0.0257
T*Education of school com. -0.0233
0.0316
T*Prop. civil servant teachers -0.0231
0.0276
T*Distance from school 0.0337
0.0313
T*Prop. Girls 0.00173
0.0289
Constant -0.230** -0.269** -0.284** -0.198* -0.266** -0.235** -0.232* -0.227**
0.100 0.113 0.123 0.116 0.122 0.107 0.119 0.113
Observations 772 699 693 697 587 737 734 772
R-squared 0.054 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.064 0.058 0.058 0.054
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Management Actions entail the frequency of parents association / school committee meetings, whether the mother association is active, and 
whether the school committee is in charge of collecting fees / spending fees / infrastructure / furnitures
Dependent Variable: Index of Parents' Participation to Management Actions
 
Table 5: The Impact of Grants on Community Participation to Teacher Supervision
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) -0.0475 0.0361 0.0704 -0.150 -0.0952 -0.0499 0.140 -0.286
0.0724 0.0929 0.178 0.142 0.0958 0.102 0.193 0.287
T*Wealth of school com. 0.0896
0.105
T*Director same language -0.0688
0.0764
T*Director seniority 0.0306
0.0747
T*Education of school com. 0.140*
0.0848
T*Prop. civil servant teachers -0.0184
0.0789
T*Distance from school -0.0849
0.0711
T*Prop. Girls 0.0674
0.0769
Constant 2.787*** 2.479*** 2.835*** 2.746*** 2.475*** 2.848*** 2.599*** 2.904***
0.271 0.289 0.316 0.305 0.318 0.286 0.312 0.307
Observations 752 695 684 683 585 720 715 752
R-squared 0.064 0.068 0.078 0.073 0.094 0.068 0.073 0.065
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Whether School committee supervise teacher attendance
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Table 6: The Impact of Grants on Community Participation to Teacher Remedial
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) -0.0302 0.0254 -0.247 -0.127 -0.0114 0.0358 0.0194 -0.0233
0.0723 0.0880 0.180 0.142 0.104 0.0987 0.208 0.266
T*Wealth of school com. 0.0861
0.0853
T*Director same language 0.0812
0.0772
T*Director seniority 0.0587
0.0750
T*Education of school com. 0.0370
0.0861
T*Prop. civil servant teachers -0.0663
0.0730
T*Distance from school -0.0122
0.0792
T*Prop. Girls -0.00196
0.0725
Constant 0.849*** 0.986*** 0.992*** 0.999*** 0.779** 0.801*** 1.056*** 0.846***
0.275 0.306 0.321 0.309 0.345 0.292 0.318 0.303
Observations 752 695 684 683 585 720 715 752
R-squared 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.055 0.051 0.055 0.061 0.050
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Whether the school committee took any sanction against teachers
 
Table 7: The Impact of Grants on Community Support to School Activities
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) 0.135*** 0.149*** 0.167* 0.182** 0.0630 0.0863* 0.374*** -0.135
0.0391 0.0504 0.0874 0.0750 0.0533 0.0538 0.0982 0.150
T*Wealth of school com. 0.0384
0.0538
T*Director same language -0.0193
0.0385
T*Director seniority -0.0468
0.0383
T*Education of school com. 0.0853*
0.0443
T*Prop. civil servant teachers 0.0496
0.0419
T*Distance from school -0.0997***
0.0367
T*Prop. Girls 0.0761*
0.0400
Constant -0.166 -0.245 -0.0987 -0.140 -0.345** -0.196 -0.344** -0.0324
0.145 0.158 0.160 0.161 0.169 0.157 0.161 0.157
Observations 752 695 685 684 585 720 715 752
R-squared 0.110 0.123 0.118 0.104 0.123 0.113 0.124 0.115
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Supportive actions entail financial contributions, help in kind, pupil supervision and pupil remedial
Dependent Variable: Index of Parents' Participation to Supportive Actions
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Table 8: The Impact of Grants on School Quality: Accountability and Transparency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Explanatory Variables Fees Collection1 Fees Expenses1 Pupil Attendance
Teacher 
Attendance Inspector's Visits Material Inventory Weekly Activities
Improvement 
Plan1
Treatment (T) 0.124* 0.205*** -0.00978 -0.0280 -0.0313 -0.0184 -0.0570 0.0807
0.0710 0.0715 0.0785 0.0727 0.0716 0.0715 0.0687 0.0707
T 0.0874 0.163** 0.0162 -0.00163 -0.0558 -0.120 -0.189** 0.135*
0.0810 0.0801 0.0916 0.0893 0.0811 0.0789 0.0856 0.0800
T*Wealth of school com. -0.0766 -0.0606 0.100 0.0773 -0.0842 -0.0993 -0.260*** 0.118
0.0766 0.0735 0.0863 0.0871 0.0740 0.0672 0.0805 0.0755
T 0.400** 0.323* -0.0821 -0.121 -0.00197 0.129 -0.0749 0.0453
0.180 0.181 0.186 0.164 0.182 0.168 0.163 0.187
T*Director same language -0.116 -0.0453 0.0280 0.0568 -0.00289 -0.0582 0.0159 0.0282
0.0774 0.0777 0.0811 0.0716 0.0778 0.0716 0.0717 0.0794
T 0.341** 0.460*** -0.0279 -0.148 0.153 -0.0768 -0.214* -0.0456
0.133 0.141 0.149 0.151 0.133 0.148 0.128 0.136
T*Director seniority -0.126* -0.147* -0.0202 0.104 -0.115* 0.0211 0.101 0.0954
0.0708 0.0791 0.0818 0.0930 0.0694 0.0850 0.0678 0.0696
T 0.225** 0.254** -0.102 -0.0718 0.121 -0.0375 0.0495 0.0470
0.104 0.106 0.112 0.0971 0.105 0.0948 0.102 0.0964
T*Education of school com. -0.0828 -0.0804 0.0996 0.00887 -0.146* -0.0290 -0.162* 0.0638
0.0806 0.0815 0.0912 0.0833 0.0840 0.0785 0.0845 0.0806
T 0.0708 0.165 0.0334 -0.123 0.0231 0.0508 0.0462 0.0287
0.101 0.101 0.112 0.103 0.0998 0.111 0.0948 0.101
T*Prop. civil servant teachers 0.0594 0.0480 -0.0535 0.129* -0.0753 -0.0853 -0.125* 0.0766
0.0753 0.0752 0.0801 0.0750 0.0739 0.0848 0.0685 0.0735
T -0.0577 0.179 0.467** 0.0183 -0.159 0.370** 0.0260 -0.327*
0.196 0.199 0.205 0.180 0.195 0.179 0.190 0.189
T*Distance from school 0.0740 0.0102 -0.193** -0.0120 0.0436 -0.161** -0.0368 0.165**
0.0743 0.0756 0.0751 0.0631 0.0729 0.0653 0.0715 0.0704
T 0.358 0.395 -0.273 -0.229 -0.320 -0.0642 0.129 0.0163
0.277 0.279 0.316 0.289 0.278 0.293 0.258 0.277
T*Prop. Girls -0.0662 -0.0539 0.0742 0.0567 0.0807 0.0127 -0.0520 0.0182
0.0761 0.0766 0.0843 0.0780 0.0754 0.0765 0.0716 0.0748
Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
1  The register was produced to be seen by the interviewer
Dependent Variable: Whether the School Uses a Register for…
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Table 9: The Impact of Grants on School Quality: Teacher Eﬀort
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) -0.109 -0.166** -0.130 -0.160 -0.0190 -0.119 0.0242 -0.205
0.0675 0.0700 0.171 0.122 0.0873 0.0890 0.159 0.297
T*Wealth of school com. -0.0117
0.0565
T*Director same language 0.0202
0.0725
T*Director seniority 0.0218
0.0582
T*Education of school com. -0.0911
0.0723
T*Prop. civil servant teachers 0.0102
0.0619
T*Distance from school -0.0531
0.0556
T*Prop. Girls 0.0269
0.0782
Constant 3.211*** 3.240*** 3.296*** 3.294*** 3.158*** 3.260*** 2.914*** 3.258***
0.236 0.252 0.286 0.256 0.248 0.253 0.259 0.285
Observations 758 677 685 713 569 758 730 758
R-squared 0.183 0.185 0.185 0.180 0.186 0.183 0.192 0.183
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Proportion of teachers present the day of visit
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) 0.0497 0.0367 -0.164 0.0481 -0.0300 0.105 -0.108 0.461*
0.0683 0.0744 0.151 0.108 0.0958 0.0932 0.180 0.276
T*Wealth of school com. 0.0722
0.0634
T*Director same language 0.107
0.0650
T*Director seniority -0.00319
0.0512
T*Education of school com. 0.106
0.0728
T*Prop. civil servant teachers -0.0223
0.0636
T*Distance from school 0.0646
0.0674
T*Prop. Girls -0.116
0.0730
Constant 2.031*** 1.966*** 2.336*** 2.334*** 2.185*** 2.000*** 2.157*** 1.826***
0.244 0.278 0.266 0.244 0.286 0.251 0.272 0.274
Observations 791 696 689 695 586 737 739 791
R-squared 0.104 0.078 0.044 0.036 0.070 0.059 0.049 0.107
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Whether the school director was present the day of visit
 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (T) -0.0121 -0.0390 -0.177 -0.0338 -0.0454 0.0549 -0.0301 -0.256
0.0658 0.0633 0.157 0.0994 0.0769 0.0863 0.171 0.292
T*Wealth of school com. 0.00669
0.0479
T*Director same language 0.0664
0.0653
T*Director seniority 0.00515
0.0484
T*Education of school com. 0.0315
0.0638
T*Prop. civil servant teachers -0.0609
0.0556
T*Distance from school 0.00964
0.0708
T*Prop. Girls 0.0685
0.0745
Constant 3.008*** 2.978*** 3.081*** 3.094*** 2.972*** 3.018*** 3.234*** 3.128***
0.189 0.194 0.185 0.191 0.201 0.172 0.211 0.242
Observations 808 704 694 701 588 745 747 808
R-squared 0.155 0.137 0.105 0.121 0.123 0.119 0.100 0.156
Notes: Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. 
Standard errors below point estimates. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Whether the school was open the day of visit
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Table 10: The Impact of Grants on the Demand for Education: Enrollment and Dropouts
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Girls Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total
Treatment -0.0142 0.104** 0.0127 -0.0275 0.00475 -0.0331 0.00789
(0.0474) (0.0425) (0.0420) (0.0425) (0.0433) (0.0456) (0.0228)
Constant 0.894*** -0.460** -0.362* -0.459** -0.631*** -0.611** -0.379***
(0.211) (0.223) (0.199) (0.193) (0.204) (0.246) (0.136)
Obs. 984 984 984 984 984 984 978
R-squared 0.461 0.569 0.579 0.561 0.551 0.510 0.881
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel B: Boys Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total
Treatment 0.00868 0.100** -0.0390 -0.00573 0.0303 -0.0122 0.0108
(0.0500) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0504) (0.0488) (0.0475) (0.0244)
Constant 1.215*** 0.438** 0.754*** 0.523*** 0.456** 0.486** 0.859***
(0.208) (0.212) (0.204) (0.198) (0.198) (0.190) (0.141)
Obs. 984 984 984 984 984 984 978
R-squared 0.404 0.455 0.462 0.389 0.429 0.466 0.866
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel B: Total Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total
Treatment -0.00160 0.107** -0.0180 -0.0156 0.0216 -0.0225 0.0175
(0.0476) (0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0466) (0.0452) (0.0446) (0.0160)
Constant 1.124*** 0.0402 0.296 0.136 0.0271 0.0380 0.151**
(0.207) (0.215) (0.197) (0.189) (0.188) (0.200) (0.0630)
Obs. 984 984 984 984 984 984 959
R-squared 0.458 0.533 0.535 0.473 0.509 0.524 0.940
Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Enrollement in 2008-2009, by Schools
 
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Girls Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total
Treatment -0.0827 -0.171* -0.124 -0.0971 -0.0702 0.126 -0.0765
(0.0860) (0.102) (0.0852) (0.0927) (0.0994) (0.0931) (0.0731)
Constant 0.438** 1.009** 1.027*** 1.396*** 1.180** 0.809** 1.092***
(0.217) (0.459) (0.354) (0.512) (0.466) (0.394) (0.276)
Obs. 538 438 530 463 382 449 753
R-squared 0.028 0.059 0.041 0.106 0.062 0.108 0.051
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel B: Boys Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total
Treatment -0.170* 0.0333 -0.124 -0.0453 0.0729 -0.0473 -0.0754
(0.0931) (0.107) (0.0832) (0.0953) (0.0964) (0.0943) (0.0730)
Constant 0.320 0.566** 0.754** 1.262** 1.232** 0.641** 0.849***
(0.219) (0.278) (0.294) (0.547) (0.503) (0.325) (0.227)
Obs. 539 440 529 462 385 463 754
R-squared 0.041 0.042 0.049 0.069 0.065 0.091 0.059
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel B: Total Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total
Treatment -0.174* -0.0649 -0.133 -0.0706 0.0261 0.0135 -0.0736
(0.0908) (0.109) (0.0838) (0.0940) (0.0965) (0.0931) (0.0727)
Constant 0.396* 0.611** 0.886*** 1.377** 1.332** 0.808** 0.967***
(0.215) (0.302) (0.332) (0.548) (0.516) (0.363) (0.229)
Obs. 540 440 530 463 387 466 752
R-squared 0.038 0.041 0.045 0.084 0.069 0.103 0.053
Data source: School survey conducted in April-May 2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%
Dependent Variable: Dropout Rate in late 2007-2008, by Schools
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Table 11: Channel of the Eﬀect on the Demand for Education: Participation or Quality?
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
CP enrollment 
2008 
CP enrollment 
2008 
CP enrollment 
2008 
CP enrollment 
2008 
          
Treatment  0.0899* 0.0721 0.0883* 0.0715 
 0.0488 0.0502 0.0490 0.0503 
Participation Index  0.165**  0.164** 
  0.0687  0.0694 
Infrastructure Index   0.0256 0.0125 
   0.0590 0.0595 
Constant -0.125 -0.0934 -0.124 -0.0936 
 0.222 0.222 0.221 0.222 
     
Observations 745 745 745 745 
R-squared 0.592 0.595 0.592 0.595 
Participation Index Data Source: School survey conducted April-May 2008. 
Infrastructure Index and Enrollment Data Source: DSI survey data 2008 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%   
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